New Approaches to Stress Testing the Czech Banking Sector (in English) by Martin ÈIHÁK et al.
Finance a úvěr - Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 2007, 57(1-2)                                                41 
UDC: 336.71(437.3);519.866;330.131.7 
JEL Classification: G21, G28, G32, K20 
Keywords: Czech banking sector; financial sector; interbank contagion; macroeconomic model of credit risk; 
stress testing 
New Approaches to Stress Testing 
the Czech Banking Sector 
Martin ČIHÁK – International Monetary Fund (MCihak@imf.org) 
Jaroslav HEŘMÁNEK – Czech National Bank (jaroslav.hermanek@cnb.cz) 
Michal HLAVÁČEK
1 – Czech National Bank and Institute of Economic Studies, Charles 
University (michal.hlavacek@cnb.cz) 
Abstract 
This paper provides an overview of the stress testing of the Czech banking sector conducted 
by the Czech National Bank. The paper begins by updating historical and hypothetical 
stress-testing scenarios. It also includes a sensitivity analysis of the interest-rate risk and 
new presentation forms of such. The results of interbank contagion tests (both simple and 
combined) based on Czech banks’ exposures on the interbank market are offered. Finally, 
the paper integrates the stress testing with CNB macroeconomic forecasts (i.e., the quasi- 
-phase-matching model). The authors’ stress testing was also integrated with the macro-
economic credit-risk model, with the impact on individual bank portfolios, and with inter-
bank contagion. One baseline and three alternative scenarios were tested they have shown 
that the Czech banking sector was relatively resilient to the shocks. However, the exercise also 
revealed certain limitations of the stress-testing approach, to which the authors offer recom-
mendations for the further development of this apparatus. 
1.  Introduction 
Financial stability may be viewed as a situation where the financial system 
shows a high degree of resilience to exogenous shocks. Macroprudential stress test-
ing is a key tool of measuring financial stability because its aim is to quantify the im-
pact of extreme, but plausible shocks to the financial system.
2 Reflecting the impor-
tance of stress testing in financial stability, about 75 % of the central banks publish-
ing Financial Stability Reports or similar publications presented stress-testing results 
in these reports at the end of 2005 (Čihák, 2006).
3 
The subject of this article is to describe stress tests developed in the Czech 
National Bank. The basic methodology for stress tests for the Czech National Bank is 
1 The contribution of this author was supported by the Czech Ministry of Education Grant MSMT 0021620841.
The findings, interpretations and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those of the authors and
do not represent the views of any of the above-mentioned institutions. The authors would like to thank
Adam Geršl and Zuzana Antoničová from the CNB for their help with creation of alternative scenarios for
Section 5 of this article. 
2 The focus of this paper is macroprudential stress tests, which try to assess the robustness of the fi-
nancial system as a whole. Stress tests can also be carried out for portfolios of individual institutions,
for risk management or supervisory purposes. These so-called microprudential stress tests are not the sub-
ject of this article. A short survey of stress-testing practices in Czech banks is provided in Čihák
(2005). A survey for the major global financial institutions can be found in Committee on the Global
Financial System (2005). 
3 For a general discussion of the goals and features of the financial stability analysis, see Schinasi (2005). 42                                      Finance a úvěr - Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 2007, 57(1-2) 
described in detail in (Čihák, 2004b), (Čihák, 2005) and (Čihák, Heřmánek, 2005). 
Stress-test methodology described in those articles was then applied (with some 
modifications and further developments to the methodology) in the CNB’s Financial 
Stability Reports (CNB, 2005), (CNB, 2006). This paper includes updates for the re-
sults of the stress test together with some new forms of presentation of its results. 
The more advanced forms of stress testing (Section 5) integrate risk scenarios based 
on the CNB’s official forecast (QPM macroeconomic model (see (CNB, 2003)), with 
the macroeconomic credit-risk model ((see (Jakubík, 2007)) and with previously de-
scribed methods of interbank contagion (see Section 4 of this article). 
As part of the quantitative assessment of financial stability, a series of stress 
tests were performed to examine the resilience of the banking sector to the impact of 
selected macroeconomic shocks. These tests focus on detecting risks in the credit, 
exchange-rate and interest-rate structures of portfolios and capturing the potential 
impacts of interbank contagion. Although the tests are constructed for the financial 
sector as a whole, they use the data on the individual banks’ balance sheets. The im-
pacts of shocks on portfolios of individual banks are then aggregated (the so-called 
“bottom-up approach”). The stress tests were based on the principles and procedures 
used by the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank in missions of the Fi-
nancial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP). Similar tests are also conducted by nu-
merous foreign central banks.
4 
The article is organized as follows: The first section contains results of 
updated basic tests according to the methodology presented in the CNB’s 2004 
Financial Stability Report (CNB, 2005). Although these tests are relatively simple 
from the methodological point of view, their advantage is that they have been con-
ducted on a consistent basis since the end of 2000, which allows analyzing the de-
velopment in the sensitivity of the banking sector to external shocks. The second 
section focuses on the impacts of the interest shock. It presents sensitivity analysis of 
the approach used in the first section in terms of different sizes of the shock as well 
as different types of changes to the yield curve. The third section newly presents 
the results of analysis of contagion among banks through their exposures in the inter-
bank market. The fourth section presents the results of macro stress tests, based on 
a consistent macroeconomic model. The fifth section concludes the article and pro-
vides suggestions for further work in this area. 
2.  Basic Stress Tests with Historical Scenarios 
These basic tests are based on the methodology of two scenarios (scenarios I 
and II) representing two different types of stress.
5 The values of the parameters in 
each scenario were set in the same way as in the CNB’s Financial Stability Reports 
in order to allow for comparisons. These scenarios take into account the prevailing 
4 As in many other countries, the first impetus to carry out regular stress tests of the Czech banking sector
came from the country’s participation in the IMF-World Bank Financial Stability Assessment Program
(FSAP). The FSAP for the Czech Republic was conducted in 2001. The CNB’s stress testing methodology
was further developed in (Čihák, 2004b), (Čihák, 2005) and (Čihák, Heřmánek, 2005). A survey of the use of 
tests around the world and the testing methodology are included in (IMF, World Bank, 2003, 2005a). 
5 The basic stress test methodology, including the results of the impact of the shocks in scenarios I and II, 
was published in the Financial Stability Reports (CNB, 2005, 2006), (Čihák, 2004b), and (Čihák, Heřmá-
nek, 2005). Finance a úvěr - Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 2007, 57(1-2)                                                43 
international practice and the Czech conditions. In choosing the parameters, histo-
rical shocks (the Czech Republic's experience in 1997–1999) were taken into account. 
Scenario I is a combination of a hypothetical increase in interest rates of one per-
centage point, a 15% depreciation of the exchange rate and a 30% increase in 
the share of nonperforming loans (NPLs) by reclassification of loans. Scenario II 
combines an increase in interest rates of two percentage points, a depreciation of 
20 % and an increase in the share of NPLs in total loans of three percentage points.
6 
The impacts of these two scenarios were assessed by comparing the capital adequacy 
ratio (CAR) before the hypothetical shocks (the pre-test CAR) and after the impact of 
TABLE 1 Summary of Stress Test Results, Banking Sector  
                (data in % unless indicated otherwise) 









a  14.9  14.1  12.6  11.5 
   large banks  13.8  13.5  11.2  10.3 
   medium banks  16.7  16.9  16.8  15.8 
   small banks  21.6  19.5  18.9  14.1 
Scenario I         
Total impact of the shocks (percentage points)  -3.2  -3.2  -2.3  -2.2 
Interest rate shock  -0.9  -1.2  -1.6  -1.6 
Exchange rate shock  1.2  0.7  1.0  1.1 
Credit shock  -3.6  -2.7  -1.7  -1.6 
  of which 
  indirect impact of exchange rate shock  -1.5  -1.2  -1.1  -1.1 
Allocation of profits (percentage points) 
b  -0.1  0.8  1.7  1.6 
Post-test CAR  11.6  11.7  12.0  11.0 
   large banks  10.9  11.6  11.2  10.3 
   medium banks  12.0  11.7  15.2  14.1 
   small banks  14.3  11.3  17.0  13.5 
Capital injections (% of GDP) 
c  0.2  0.1  0.0  0.1 
Share of banks with negative capital after shock 
d  2.2  0.1  0.0  1.0 
Effect on dividens and bonuses 
e  -79.5  -92.7  -53.9  -65.9 
Scenario II         
Total impact of the shocks (percentage points)  -3.1  -4.7  -5.0  -4.8 
Interest rate shock  -1.8  -2.5  -3.3  -3.3 
Exchange rate shock  1.7  0.9  1.4  1.5 
Credit shock  -3.0  -3.2  -3.1  -3.0 
  of which 
  indirect impact of exchange rate shock  -2.0  -1.6  -1.5  -1.4 
Allocation of profits (percentage points) 
b  0.0  1.3  2.8  2.8 
Post-test CAR  11.7  10.6  10.4  9.6 
   large banks  11.5  10.6  10.2  9.3 
   medium banks  10.6  10.8  13.5  12.3 
   small banks  14.0  10.3  15.5  12.9 
Capital injections (% of GDP) 
c  0.3  0.3  0.5  0.5 
Share of banks with negative capital after shock 
d  2.2  4.0  9.3  2.3 
Effect on dividens and bonuses 
e  -93.2  -96.0  -95.3  -100.0 
Notes:   
a CAR capital adequacy ratio, defined in accordance with relevant CNB regulations. 
b Both scenarios assume that in the absence of shocks each bank would generate a profit (loss) equal 
to the average of the previous five years and that it would use any profit as a first line of defence 
against a reduction in its CAR. 
c The capital needed to ensure that each bank in the system has a post-test CAR of at least 8 %. 
d Market share of banks with negative capital folloving the assumed shocks (in % of total assets).  
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the model shocks on the banks' portfolios (the post-test CAR, see Table 1). The data 
from the end of the first half of 2006 were used. The results of the stress tests were 
compared with the results of the tests performed under the same methodology for 
the previous period starting from 2000. The stress tests followed the “bottom-up” 
methodology, i.e. they were implemented on financial data of individual banks and 
subsequently aggregated for the entire banking sector.
7 
The pre-test CAR
8 declined by 3.4 percentage points between 2000 and mid- 
-2006. This decline was due to the fact that some banks used retained profits for the pay-
ment of dividends and also to an increase in risk-weighted assets. In the same period, 
the post-test CAR declined by only 0.6 percentage point (for Scenario I) and by 2.1 per-
centage points (for Scenario II). The fact that this decline in the post-test CARs was 
lower than the decline in the pre-test CAR suggests that the banks' exposure to basic 
types of risk also declined. Also, even after the decline, the post-shock CARs in both 
Scenario I and Scenario II remained above the 8% regulatory minimum (see Chart 1). 
When interpreting stress-testing results, it is important to asses the distri-
bution of the capital adequacy prior to and after shocks. Even if the post-test CAR for 
the banking sector as a whole might be favourable, it could be below 8 % (the regu-
latory minimum) for individual banks. Reaching this minimum would require a capi-
tal injection by the banks’ owners. The dispersion 
9 of the pre-test and post-test CARs 
declined (see Chart 2), which indicates an improvement in financial stability, since 
ceteris paribus lower dispersion means that a lower share of the banking sector could 
CHART 1 Results of Stress-Testing Scenarios for the Banking Sector of the Czech Republic 










12/2000 6/2001 12/2001 6/2002 12/2002 6/2003 12/2003 6/2004 12/2004 6/2005 12/2005 6/2006
Pre-shock CAR  After shock CAR (scenario I) After shock CAR (scenario II)
 
Source: CNB – single methodology for stress testing 2005 
6 The impact of the stress test in Scenario I is much smaller in 2006 than in 2000 (see Table 1 and Chart 1). 
This is mainly because of the construction of the credit risk shock under this scenario defined as a per-
centage of the total level of the NPLs. The NPLs share in total credit was 22.1% at the end of 2000, thus 
the 30% increase of NPLs under Scenario I would lead to an increase of this share of 6.6 p.p. In June 2006 
the share of NPLs was only 3.6 %, thus the increase of NPLs would cause an increase of this ratio of 1.1 p.p. 
7 The basic stress tests concerned 24 banks that held the entire capital of the banking sector and 90.5 % of 
its total assets. The remaining portion of assets comprise the balance sheets of 12 branches of foreign
banks that do not hold any capital in the Czech Republic. 
8 i.e., the actual CAR measured as the ratio of capital to risk-weighted assets of the banking sector 
9 This dispersion was calculated as weighted standard deviation among individual banks, where the weights
were the shares of the individual banks on the risk weighted assets (RWA). Finance a úvěr - Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 2007, 57(1-2)                                                45 
experience problems after an additional shock (i.e. a lower share of banks would have 
capital adequacy lower than 8 %). However, Scenario II leads to an increase in the dis-
persion compared to the pre-shock CAR, i.e. banks that are more exposed to the risks 
in Scenario II have lower capital buffers compared to their peers. In the optimal si-
tuation, the relative capital buffer should be linked to the exposure of each bank to 
the risks from stress-testing scenarios and thus the dispersion of the after-shock CAR 
among banks should be lower than this dispersion before imposing the shock. 
The weight of individual risk factors changed in the period under review. In 
the context of an overall decline in risks, the negative impact of the interest-rate risk 
increased in absolute terms, the exchange-rate risk impact decreased in absolute terms, 
and the impact of credit risk stagnated. Large banks experienced a decline in their 
post-test CAR, but the banks are better prepared to absorb adverse stress than pre-
viously under both scenarios. The small and medium-sized banks had an acceptable 
CAR even after the tests. 
3. Resilience to an Interest-Rate Shock 
Whereas the previous section presented the stress-testing results for the two sce-
narios combining a number of risk factors, in this section we focus on one risk factor, na-
mely interest risk, and analyze it in more detail. The effect of the stress induced by a gra-
dual increase in the interest-rate shock was examined within the results of Scenario II, 
with the other parameters of the scenario remaining constant (see Chart 3). The banking 
sector was capable of absorbing the impact of an immediate increase in interest rates of 
up to three percentage points, especially if, under these adverse circumstances, the banks 
were to hold the one-or-more-year bonds in their portfolios to maturity. For the estimated 
residual maturity
10 the robustness of the stress test would correspond to a parallel shift in 
the yield curve of up to four percentage points, without the CAR of the banking sector 
declining below 8 %.
11 Compared to the previous two years the bank portfolios are re-
latively more sensitive to unexpected increases of the interest rates. 









12/2000 6/2001 12/2001 6/2002 12/2002 6/2003 12/2003 6/2004 12/2004 6/2005 12/2005 6/2006
Pre-shock After shock (scenario I) After shock (scenario II)
 
 
Source: CNB – single methodology for stress testing 2005 
10 Banking experts of commercial banks specify in their reports the estimated maturity of bonds and other 
financial instruments they are able to sell (or that will be redeemed) based on their estimates even prior to
their formal contractual maturity. 46                                      Finance a úvěr - Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 2007, 57(1-2) 
In scenarios I and II, the interest-rate shock is modeled as a parallel shift in 
the entire yield curve. However, the yield curve may change its shape and slope in 
stressful periods. For instance, short-term rates may increase more than long-term 
rates, causing the yield curve to flatten, or expectations may arise of an increase in 
short-term interest rates in the near future concurrently with an assumption of stable 
long-term interest rates, resulting in a yield curve with a peak. To assess which in-
terest rates the banks' portfolios are most sensitive to, we have analysed the impact of 
changes in the shape of the yield curve.  
In addition to the parallel shift in the yield curve, we have selected two hy-
pothetical scenarios of changes in the shape of the yield curve: a twist and a change 
in the peak. The scenarios were parameterized using extreme values of the histo-
rical variability of short-term, medium-term, and long-term yields for the countries 
of the Central European region (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia) 
in 2000–2005. For instance, an analysis of short-term three-month rates reveals that 
the maximum month-on-month change ranged between 40 (Czech Republic) and 350 
(Hungary) basis points. For the test, we used the average value (140 basis points) for 
the four countries over the six years under observation. The other parameter values 
were derived in a similar way and are comparable to those used by other central 
banks.
12  
The assumed yield-curve twist would have a bigger effect than the assumed 
change in the peak of the yield curve, but both of the impacts would be lower than 
the impact of the assumed parallel shifts in the yield curve in both Scenario I and 
Scenario II (Table 2). Given that the assumed changes in yield-curve shape are based 
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After-shock CAR (actual residual maturity, December 2005)
After-shock CAR (actual residual maturity, June 2006)
After-shock CAR (estimated residual maturity, June 2006)
After-shock CAR incl. branches of foreign banks and inter-bank contagion
(actual residual maturity, June 2006)
 
Note: Estimated residual maturity is based on estimate of banking experts of individual commercial banks. 
Source: Calculation based on CNB data 
11 The analysis presented here is an example of the so-called “threshold approach,” which tries to identify
the maximum shock that a banking sector would be able to withstand (Čihák, 2004a). 
12 See the survey of stress tests in central banks’ financial stability reports in (Čihák, 2005) and (Čihák, 
2006). Similar scenarios can be found for example in (Deutsche Bundesbank, 2005). Finance a úvěr - Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 2007, 57(1-2)                                                47 
on extreme value from the Central European region, while the parallel interest-rate shock 
in Scenario I does not go beyond the monitored historical variability in the Central Euro-
pean region, the results suggest that the banks’ portfolios are relatively more exposed to 
parallel shifts in the yield curve than to its twist or a change in its peak. 
4.  Interbank Contagion Tests 
4.1  Interbank Contagion-Test Methodology 
Bank-to-bank exposures in the interbank market can play an important role 
in spreading failures from one bank to another. Overall, credit exposures of resident 
banks in the interbank market fell by about half between 1997 and mid-2006 (see 
Chart 4). However, the overall numbers provide only a very rough indication of the in-
terconnectedness in the interbank market. To analyze the linkages more precisely, one 
needs to look at the sizes of the individual bank-by-bank credit exposures.
13 
The contagion tests examine the situation of a bank (or a group of banks) 
defaulting on obligations to another bank or group of banks. This involves capturing 
the impacts of contagion in the interbank market in the event of a bank´s capital 
inadequacy. We test the extent to which banks are sensitive to interbank contagion 
risk and the banks’ ability to cover by capital their own liabilities and outstanding 
claims vis-à-vis banks in default.
14 
The contagion tests use as inputs data from interbank exposure matrices 
based on the banking and trading portfolios and loans and deposits received. Two 
methods are used to determine the net exposure of creditor and debtor banks. Under 
method 1, the test uses the greater of the values of assets and liabilities of interbank 
exposures that constitute the worst-case scenario. This is the maximum outstanding 
amount over the entire duration of the contractual relations between the banks. Under 
method 2, the test uses uncollateralised loans and deposits received that represent 
the immediate outstanding amount from the exposures (their aggregate impact on 
banks is lower and so some of them are not reported separately in the summary of 
TABLE 2  Impacts of Changes in the Shape of the Yield Curve 
Tested portfolios   Short-term  Medium-
term  Long-term  Interest rate 
shock 
Scenarios   up to 1 year  1–5 years  over 5 years  2005 
Shape of yield curve  Change in basis points (±)  % of CAR 
Rotation  140   70  40  -1.28 
Change in peak     0   60    0  -0.20 
Parallel shift Scen. I  100  100  100  -1.72 
                    Scen. II  200  200  200  -3.46 
 
13 Exposures here mean the mutual claims monitored in a report on exposures and over-limit deposits and 
loans received. These are the claims of one bank against another in both the banking portfolio (interbank
loans) and the trading portfolio (holdings of bank bonds). The statement does not include all interbank
claims, only those which exceed a particular share of the bank's capital. 
14 We focus here on contagion through insolvency, following the examples in (Degryse, Nguyen, 2004), 
(Upper, Worms, 2002), and (Čihák, 2004 a,b). Another possible contagion channel is through liquidity. 
The methodology for modeling liquidity contagion would be very similar; however, its implementation
would be more complicated due to the difficulties of estimating the relationships between liquidity out-
flows in different institutions (the matrix of “liquidity exposures”). 48                                      Finance a úvěr - Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 2007, 57(1-2) 
results of the individual tests). In the contagion tests the interbank exposure is reas-
sessed for each bank with respect to any other bank. Both tests use a 100% and 40% 
expected loss given default. 
Compared to the preliminary interbank contagion results presented in 
(CNB, 2006), this article shows results of extended tests that also consider exposu-
res of the foreign bank branches active in the Czech Republic.
15 These banks could 
offer banking services in the Czech Republic and are present on the Czech inter-
bank market, so they could eventually be the source of shock to the banking system 
as a whole. An important complication with analyzing foreign bank branches is 
that they do not report capital levels because the parent company’s capital would 
be used to cover the losses in the branch. However, the parent company also has 
risky exposures in other subsidiaries against which it needs to hold capital. To 
approximate the capital needed to hold against the exposures of the Czech branch, 
we use the branch’s reported levels of risk-weighted assets, and assume that 
the foreign bank branches have the CAR equal to the rest of the banking sector.
16 
This approach has the advantage that it does not change the overall pre-shock capital 
adequacy figures, and it provides a good picture of possible contagion arising from 
failures in the foreign banks. As to the impact of resident banks’ failures on the fo-
reign banks, our calculations provide only a broad (and prudent) approximation of 
the risks, because the parent company would normally have in place more capital 
than needed for the branch’s exposures (unless it also faces failures in other countries 
where it operates). 
The interbank test could be performed either as a simple test or as a com-
bined test. Both tests are based on the same set of interbank exposures, but differ 
in whether or not they take into account the probability of default of individual 
banks. 
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Large liabilities as % of total liabilities between resident banks
 
Source: CNB 
15 These interbank contagion tests covered only 11 from 12 existing foreign bank braches as one of
the branches entered the Czech banking market in the first half of 2006. 
16 An alternative approach would be to use the CAR of the parent institution of the branch. However, as 
the foreign bank branches originate from different states and jurisdictions, the comparability of such
figures would be questionable. Finance a úvěr - Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 2007, 57(1-2)                                                49 
4.1.1  Simple Test 
The simple test examines the potential impact of the failure of each indi-
vidual bank on the banking sector as a whole. The test assumes that the bank be-
comes insolvent (“primary insolvency”) and defaults on its obligations in the inter-
bank market. This test does not examine the reasons of such a failure and its pro-
bability. 
The test consists of calculating how the default may impact other banks that 
have uncovered exposures to the insolvent bank. If one (or more) of these banks be-
comes insolvent (“secondary insolvency”), we need to perform a second iteration of 
the test and calculate how this secondary insolvency impacts other banks in the system 
through their net uncovered exposures vis-à-vis the banks facing secondary insol-
vency. If the test reveals that secondary insolvency leads to other banks becoming in-
solvent (“tertiary insolvency”), we need to perform a third iteration of the calcu-
lation, and continue until this “domino effect” stops, i.e. until the insolvency induced 
in one bank or group of banks does not lead to other bank insolvencies. 
The simple interbank contagion test consists of 35 separate sub-tests, one for 
each bank in the system. The difference between the pre-test and post-test CAR of 
the banking system may be viewed as a measure of the bank's systemic significance: 
the bigger the decline in the CAR of the system, the greater the systemic importance 
of the bank whose failure is assumed. 
4.1.2  Combined Test 
The combined test uses a similar calculation method as the simple test, but 
takes into account the different probabilities of default of the banks. This test 
examines changes in the external risk factors that affect all banks simultaneously. 
Unlike the simple test, then, this method does not use 35 separate sub-tests, but just 
one integrated test in which the probability of insolvency is higher in banks that are 
more sensitive to changes in the external risk factors. Unlike in the simple test, it is 
possible that primary insolvency will occur in several banks simultaneously. Another 
different feature of this test is that the subsequent calculations of contagion are 
performed in a system that is already weakened by the effects of the initial 
macroeconomic stress scenario (Table 4). 
Bank default can be modeled in stress tests in various ways. The simpler 
method that was used in the above-mentioned simple interbank test is based on the as-
sumption that banks with negative capital will default and, conversely, that banks with 
positive capital will not default. In practice, however, even banks with positive capital 
can fail. In order to make it more realistic, the combined test – unlike the simple test – 
also took into account the fact that the probability of default of banks with positive 
capital is not zero. It was assumed that this probability decreases with increasing capital 
of each of the individual banks (Table 3).
17 The iterative calculation of the “domino 
effect” is performed along similar lines as in the case of the simple test, i.e. as long as 
the new iterations result in some other bank in the test being included in a worse CAR 
group (i.e. a group with higher probability of default) or ceasing to receive capital.
18   
17 The calculation of the expected loss E = Exp*LGD*PD, where Exp stands for the amount of the bank's 
exposure, LGD denotes the expected loss given default (100 % or 40 %) and PD stands for the probability of 
default of the bank. The probability of default parameters were calibrated based on experience from abroad. 50                                      Finance a úvěr - Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 2007, 57(1-2) 
4.2 Results of Interbank Contagion Tests 
In the simple test, for most banks the effect of their loss of solvency on the rest 
of the banking sector was negligible (impacts of up to one percentage point on the sec-
tor's CAR). For some banks, the impact of insolvency of each individual bank on the sec-
tor's CAR was three percentage points on average. Nevertheless, for all of these banks 
the CAR after the simple test stayed above the required minimum of 8 %. The banking 
sector reached equilibrium after the second iteration in the simple test.  
Although the results of individual banks’ contagion tests could not be pub-
lished due to legal confidentiality restrictions, the averages for major bank groups il-
lustrate the systemic importance of individual banks in each group. In Chart 5 we used 
information on the 35 sub-tests measuring impact on the total sector CAR arising from 
the failure of each individual bank. We then calculated averages from these tests along 
the different groups of banks. Thus the column “large banks” shows the average of re-
sults of the five sub-sets calculated for large banks, the building-societies column re-
presents the average of results for six sub-tests conducted for building societies, and so 
on. The tests confirm the high systemic importance of large banks, and suggest that 
systemic importance decreases quickly with the size of the bank. The tests indicate that 
systemic importance of the building societies is even lower than for the small banks 
(reflecting the fact that the building societies mostly enter the interbank market as 
lenders rather than borrowers). In contrast, the systemic importance of foreign bank 
branches as a group is relatively high, similar to medium-sized banks, confirming the ap-
propriateness of incorporating those institutions in the contagion test. 
In the combined test with the Scenario II shocks incorporated (i.e., using 
the more stressful set of shocks to external risk factors), the resulting CAR would be 
9.2 % and the loss due to interbank contagion would be 0.5 percentage point in the CAR. 
The maximum loss of the banks in default could reach 0.6  % of the total capital in 
the banking sector (Table 4). The contagion among the banks in the system stops after 
the third iteration. 
5. Macro Stress Test Using Consistent Model Scenarios 
The shocks and scenarios used in the previous sections were not derived 
from formal models; they were assumptions based on historical values. In this sec-
tion, we focus on model-based macro stress tests, in which the shocks to the indi-
TABLE 3  Explicit Combination of CAR and Probability of the Bank's Failure (Default) 
in Interbank Contagion Stress Testing 
CAR  Probability of 
failure/default (PD) 
   < 0 %  100 % 
  0–5 %    25 % 
  5–8 %    15 % 
8–10 %      5 % 
  > 10%         0.5 % 
 
18 Similar mapping is typically a part of supervisory early warning systems, and can be estimated based on
past instances of failures. The values used in Table 3 are expert estimates based on foreign practice. A si-
milar method to interbank exposure testing is described for example in (IMF, World Bank, 2005b). Finance a úvěr - Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 2007, 57(1-2)                                                51 
vidual external risk factors (interest rates, exchange rates, changes in asset quality) 
are interconnected through a macroeconomic model. The macro stress test is based 
on (i) testing macroeconomic variables and related outputs from the official CNB 
macroeconomic forecasting model and (ii) the macroeconomic credit-risk model. As 
an illustration, shocks to different scenarios of development of the sector's financial 
stability are tested on data on the portfolios of individual banks as of the end of 2005. 
The model scenarios were generated in three steps (Chart 6). In the first 
step, consistent macroeconomic scenarios were obtained from the CNB’s forecasting 
model (QPM
19). These scenarios capture the development of key macroeconomic 
variables (such as the GDP growth rate, inflation rate, interest rates, and exchange 
rates) in the near future under “normal” circumstance (in the baseline scenario) and 
stressful circumstances (i.e., under an external shock or combination of macroeco-
nomic shocks). In this way, two key inputs to the stress testing were obtained, na-
mely interest rates and exchange rates. 
In the second step, the macroeconomic credit-risk model was used to estimate 
the evolution of NPLs in banks' portfolios based on the development of macroeconomic 
indicators.
20 As the main output of the macroeconomic credit-risk model is the quarterly 
change in NPLs, and given that the stress testing works with growth in NPLs over a one- 
-year time horizon, it was necessary to annualise the results of the credit-risk model.
21  
In the third step, results from the individual bank’s responses to the shock 
were used to run the interbank contagion tests, using the “combined test” methodo-
logy described in Section 4.1. 
The baseline model scenario uses the official CNB forecast of April 2006 
and serves as an estimate of the likely development of the Czech economy in 2006 
CHART 5  Impact of Interbank Contagion on Systemic CAR  










Small banks Bulding societes Foreign bank
branches
 
Note: Systemic CAR along bank groups, result of simple test interbank contagion test. 
Source: Calculation based on CNB data from June 2006. 
19 QPM stands for Quarterly Prediction Model. For a basic description of the methodology of this model, 
see (CNB, 2003). Results of the prediction model are discussed in the CNB’s quarterly inflation reports
(CNB, 2000–06). 
20 This model is described in (Jakubík, 2006) and in (CNB, 2005). 
21 This annualisation was performed as follows: The annual change in NPLs was estimated for four suc-
cessive estimates of the quarterly default ratio, which were then summed. The dampening effect of mone-
tary policy could thus manifest itself in the shock scenarios in the second to fourth quarters. 52                                      Finance a úvěr - Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 2007, 57(1-2) 
and 2007. Besides the baseline model scenario, three alternative scenarios (A, B, and C) 
were proposed which reflect less probable, but still plausible shocks. The shocks in 
these scenarios take into consideration the history of real economic growth and its 
links to other macroeconomic variables. 

















TABLE 4  Summary of Results of the Combined Stress Test for the Interbank Contagion, 
June 2006 
Stress test  Actual 
values 
X  Scenario I  Scenario II 








Anticipated level of loss given 
default (LGD)  20 %  40 %  100 %  40 %  100 % 
Capital adequacy ratio (CAR)  
before contagion  11.5  11.0  11.0  9.7  9.7 
CAR after-contagion 
   Average (weighted)  11.5  10.9  10.8  9.4  9.2 
   Average (non-weighted)  18.0  14.5  14.3  6.7  5.7 
   Median  11.5  10.3  10.3  7.9  7.3 
 
Number of banks and foreign 
banks branches  35  35  35  35  35 
   with CAR < 0%  0  2  2  6  7 
   with CAR < 8%  0  13  14  18  18 
   with CAR < 10%  5  17  17  23  23 
Share of banks and branches  
with CAR < 0 % (in default)  
total banks' and branches' net 
exposure in the sector's assets  x  0.1  0.1  0.3  0.5 
loss on banks' and branches' net 
exposure in the sector's 
capital 
X 
x  0.0  0.0  -0.7  -0.6 
loss banks' and branches' net ex-
posure in the sector's assets 
X  x  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
total share of banks' and 
branches' assets in 
the sector's assets 
x  0.9  0.9  4.2  5.1 
 
Notes:  
X This is a sum of losses of creditor banks (and branches) on debtor banks' (net) exposures in default. 
  Ab – exposure of the banking portfolio (assets) 
  Ao – exposure of the trading portfolio (assets) 
  P – loans and deposits received (liabilities) Finance a úvěr - Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 2007, 57(1-2)                                                53 
5.1  Baseline Scenario 
The baseline scenario was derived from the April 2006 CNB forecast
22, 
which expected real GDP growth of 6.1 % in 2006 and 5.4 % in 2007. Inflation 
was projected to be below 3 % in 2006 and edge up to 3.4 % in 2007. Growth in 
regulated prices, changes to indirect taxes, and a rise in inflation expectations were 
to be the major factors contributing to the rise in inflation. Consistent with the fo-
recast was an initial period of interest rate stability followed by a gradual rise in 
interest rates. 
The baseline scenario does not contain any risks that would pose an imme-
diate threat to the financial sector and its stability. Low interest rates, the positive 
outlook for investment activity and GDP growth will further boost growth in lending 
to households and corporations. The low interest rate differential will prevent growth 
in debt in foreign currencies. 
Due to the nature of stress testing, even the baseline scenario should not be 
taken as a prediction of development of the CAR and NPLs in the next year. Simu-
lations of the macro stress tests on baseline predictions of the QPM model from 
the last 3½ years show that both the actual CARs and the actual NPL inflows were 
better than the projections from the stress-testing model (Chart 7). The reasons for 
this were twofold. Firstly, the actual GDP developments turned out to be better than 
the original CNB forecasts and inflation was on average lower, meaning that the in-
terest rate paths were mostly revised downwards in the examined period. Secondly, 
the stress-testing sheet focuses on (gross) inflows into the stock of the NPLs to asses 
the influence on the CAR, thereby omitting the outflow of the NPLs. This is only 
partly compensated by taking into account the accumulation of “baseline” profit. 
Even the baseline scenario thus reflects the conservative (“prudent”) analytical ap-
proach that underlies stress testing. 
CHART 7  “Predictions” According to Baseline Scenarios  






9/2004 3/2005 9/2005 3/2006 9/2006 3/2007 9/2007





inflow NPL prediction (L.A.) inflow NPL reality (L.A.) CAR reality (R.A.) CAR predicted (R.A.)
 
Note: CAR is being calculated semi-annually, when we have full information on the bank sector portfolio. 
The prediction of inflow of the NPLs is available quarterly 
22 A detailed description of the CNB macroeconomic forecast is given in the CNB Inflation Report (2006),
available at www.cnb.cz. 54                                      Finance a úvěr - Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 2007, 57(1-2) 
5.2  Alternative Scenarios 
In addition to the baseline scenario three alternative scenarios were created. 
The difference of these scenarios from the baseline scenario is summarised in Table 5. 
Periods for different variables in Table 5 reflect the way the different variables and 
their predictions enter stress testing. GDP growth and inflation enter stress testing via 
the macroeconomic credit-risk model with lags according to this model; interest-rate 
and exchange-rate enter stress testing directly in the first predicted quarter.
23 
5.2.1  Alternative Scenario A 
Alternative scenario A analyses the potential response of the domestic economy 
to a significant global negative shock.
24 Such a shock might hypothetically occur in a si-
tuation where global imbalances associated with a loss of confidence in the main eco-
nomic zones are suddenly corrected and interest rates of the main world currencies, i.e. 
the dollar and the euro, rise rapidly. The scenario also includes a large downturn in glo-
bal economic activity and inflation, further intensified by a strong monetary restriction. 
The downturn in the economic activity of the Czech Republic's major trading partners 
would have a relatively sizeable impact on its macroeconomic situation and exports. 
GDP growth rates in 2006 and 2007 would be about 1–2 percentage points lower than 
in the case of the baseline scenario, and interest rates would be considerably higher.  
The impact of alternative scenario A on the stability of the financial system 
would to some extent depend on the distribution of the decline in GDP across the in-
dividual sectors of the economy. In any event, however, it would influence the ability 
of economic agents to service their debts. The increase in interest rates would ampli-
fy this effect and would have an adverse impact on banking portfolios. 
5.2.2  Alternative Scenario B 
Alternative scenario B combines the effect of developments in the nominal 
exchange rate and inflation. This scenario assumes a sudden exchange-rate appre-
TABLE 5  Differences of Alternative Scenarios from Baseline Scenario for the Year 2006 
 
Type of scenario  Period  Scenario A  Scenario B  Scenario C 
Real GDP growth (% y-o-y)  1Q 2007  -1.6  -1.4  -3.2 
Inflation rate - CPI (% y-o-y)  3Q 2006  0.4  0.2  0.0 
Interest rate (percentage points)  2Q 2006  1.6  -0.8  -0.6 
Exchange rate (percentage points)  2Q 2006  4.5  -7.3  2.1 
Source: CNB 
23 As already mentioned in Chart 6, interest rates in fact enter stress testing two times. In the first stance 
the change of interest rates influences banking portfolios directly through the standard interest-risk channel. 
To model this impact we use the prediction of interest rates for the first quarter after the shock. Afterwards
the change of the interest rates also influences credit risk, which is modeled by the macroeconomic credit-risk 
model (see (Jakubík, 2006)). This model uses the current value of interest rates and thus the differences of 
the alternative scenarios from the baseline are equal to zero. 
24 The global negative shock should be generated in a global economic model describing a realistic and
consistent trajectory for foreign interest rates, inflation, economic activity and, where appropriate, the cross-
-exchange rate. In this scenario, this is not the case. For reasons of simplicity and in order to achieve a really
strong shock, a significant shock to euro-area interest rates, German GDP and inflation is assumed. Finance a úvěr - Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 2007, 57(1-2)                                                55 
ciation and a negative supply shock (e.g., a poor harvest or other shock to the supply 
of goods and services) that would, ceteris paribus, result in rising prices. However, 
the stronger exchange rate would cause a slight decline in inflation and GDP growth 
compared to the baseline scenario. The monetary policy response would be to cut in-
terest rates to a very low level. 
In contrast to scenario A, the impact of scenario B is more favourable. The de-
cline in GDP growth is only temporary, and although disposable income falls, easing of 
the monetary policy reduces the loan repayment burden, at least insofar as it allows 
debtors to swap their rates for lower ones. The decline in interest rates also means less 
pressure on banks' portfolios, although it might lead to lower interest margins and 
hence might also reduce banks' profitability. 
5.2.3  Alternative Scenario C 
Alternative scenario C reflects the potential risks associated with a possible 
drop in domestic demand and assumes a gradual decline in GDP growth between 
Q2 2006 and Q1 2007. A drop in domestic demand, and hence also in economic 
activity, might be caused, for instance, by a sharp decline in corporate investment ac-
tivity in a situation of investment outflows due to cost optimisation. This would lead 
to an increase in unemployment and a fall in household consumption. A strong fiscal 
restriction might also foster a drop in domestic demand. 
A negative shock to GDP growth would cause the output gap to widen and 
inflation to fall. The monetary-policy response would be a substantial easing, which 
would help to revive economic activity, in particular in 2007. The lower interest rates 
compared with other countries would also foster a slight depreciation of the exchange 
rate, which, in turn, would further ease the monetary conditions. 
Scenario C provides an imperfect picture of the impact of an outflow of direct 
foreign investment on the Czech economy, since any major outflow would likely have 
more permanent implications for the structure of the economy, potential output, and 






















Note: The share of new non-performing loans (NPLs) is related to the given volume of loans at the end of 2005. 
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export performance, which monetary policy would be unable to reverse in just one or 
two years. However, it may serve as the first step in the analysis of the Czech eco-
nomy´s dependence on foreign direct investment for the purposes of assessing the im-
pact on financial stability. 
5.3  Test Results for the Model Scenarios 
The CAR in the baseline scenario would be 11.6 % in 2006 calculated on 
the December 2005 banking sector data (11.3 % on the June 2006 data). The share of 
NPLs in the given volume of claims would be 3.7 %. The CAR would be two per-
centage points lower in scenario A, at the same level in scenario B and 0.1 percen-
tage point lower in scenario C than in the baseline scenario for 2006. The new NPLs 
of the banking sector in the pessimistic scenarios A, B and C would be 4.2 %, 4.4 % 
and 5.2 % respectively at the one-year horizon (see Chart 8). 
6.  Conclusions and Directions for Further Research 
In all the scenarios presented in this article, the post-test CAR of the ban-
king sector would be 9.2 % or higher (Table 6). Some banks would fall below the re-
quired 8% minimum CAR in some of the scenarios. However, even in the most 
stressful scenarios (Scenario A and Scenario II), the capital injection needed to make 
sure that every bank satisfies the regulatory minimum would be 0.7 % of GDP or 
even less.  
The banking sector as a whole therefore seems to be resilient to the effects 
of the assumed macroeconomic and prudential shocks, even though there is variation 
among banks with regard to their sensitivity to shocks, especially to interest rates and 
interbank contagion. The banking sector was capable of withstanding both ad hoc 
scenarios based on historical experience as well as scenarios based on a formal 
macroeconomic model. 
The stress tests conducted in this article have also shown some limitations of 
this approach. The exercise has shown some challenges linked to the relatively “sta-
tic” nature of the stress-testing method, which might create some tensions when be-
ing integrated with more dynamic and advanced approaches (for example with mac-
roeconomic credit risk model or with official CNB’s macroeconomic model QPM). 
The stress-testing method does not fully take into account the reactions of the involved 
economic agents (financial institutions, depositors, and regulators), including problems 
such as herding behaviour or crowded trades.  
Stress testing performed by central banks or supervisors has significant 
limits as a prediction tool. It could just give basic information about the potential 
effects of macroeconomic shocks on banks’ portfolios and thus give some rough 
supportive guidelines to actions needed to maintain stability. Macroeconomic stress 
testing also lacks some important data available to the individual financial institu-
tions and thus would never replace microeconomic stress tests conducted by banks 
themselves. However macroeconomic stress tests provide additional information about 
the spread of the different shocks across the financial system. 
Many of the above-mentioned obstacles and problems are in nature of the stress 
testing. However the exercise has shown some possibilities of improvement of this tool 
in future. These include: Finance a úvěr - Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 2007, 57(1-2)                                                57 
 Notes: 
a CAR means capital adequacy ratio defined in accordance with the relevant regulations of the Czech 
National Bank, (in particular those governing capital adequacy of banks and other prudential business 
rules) 
b Test integrated with the interbank contagion for Method 1, anticipated level of loss given default (LGD) 
100% and chosen probability of the banks' failure (default) on the basis of the CAR. 
c Scenarios assume that in the absence of shocks each bank would generate profit (or loss) at the level 
of the average figures for the previous 5 years and that it would use possible profit as the first line of 
defence against the declining CAR. 
d The capital required for each bank in order to have at least an 8% after-shock CAR. 
e Market share of banks with negative capital after the impact of assumed shocks (as a percentage of 
total assets). 
f As a percentage of dividends and royalties of previous calendar year. 
Scenario I and Scenario II are based on the chosen hypothetical and historical shocks (see part 2 of this 
article). They also include the impact of the interbank contagion. 
Scenarios: baseline, A, B and C are based on the macroeconomic prediction model of the Czech 
National Bank and the credit risk model (part 5). 
 
1. Increasing the length of the stress-testing horizon. The build-up and resolution of 
financial imbalances often lasts several years.
25 An increase of the stress-testing 
horizon could therefore make the modeling more realistic; however, it would also 
TABLE 6  Summary of Results of Stress Tests, June 2006: Banking Sector 
                 (data are in %, unless stated otherwise) 
Historical Scenarios  Macroeconomic Model Scenarios 
Scenario type  Scenario 
I 
Scenario 







a   11.5  11.5  11.5  11.5  11.5  11.5 
  large banks  10.3  10.3  10.3  10.3  10.3  10.3 
  medium-sized banks  15.8  15.8  15.8  15.8  15.8  15.8 
  small banks  14.1  14.1  14.1  14.1  14.1  14.1 
Results for the cho-




-2.3  -5.2  -2.0  -5.1  -1.6  -1.8 
Interest rate shock  -1.6  -3.3  0.0  -2.6  1.3  1.0 
Exchange rate shock  1.1  1.5  0.0  0.3  -0.5  0.2 
Credit shock  -1.6  -3.0  -1.9  -2.4  -2.2  -2.8 
of which indirect 
impact of exchan-
ge rate shock 
-1.1  -1.4  0.0  -0.3  0.0  -0.1 
Interbank contagion 
b  -0.1  -0.4  -0.1  -0.4  -0.1  -0.1 
Profit allocation 
(percentage points) 
c  1.7  2.9  1.7  2.9  1.3  1.4 
After-shock CAR  10.9  9.2  11.3  9.3  11.3  11.2 
  large banks  10.3  9.1  10.3  8.6  10.3  10.3 
  medium-sized banks  13.9  11.8  14.9  13.6  14.9  14.3 
  small banks  13.5  12.5  13.3  12.5  12.8  12.8 
Capital injection (per-
centage of GDP) 
d  0.1  0.6  0.0  0.7  0.0  0.1 
Share of banks with 
negative capital after 
shock 
f 
1.0  4.4  0.0  4.4  0.0  0.0 
Impact on dividends 
and royalties 
g  -68.6  -100.0  -57.5  -100.0  -36.7  -40.8 
25 e.g., Caprio and Klingebiel (2003) 58                                      Finance a úvěr - Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 2007, 57(1-2) 
raise demands to account more endogenous links between macroeconomic deve-
lopment and the financial system as well as among different market players within 
the financial system. 
2. Incorporation of an improved credit-risk model with separate household credit and 
non-financial enterprise credit portfolios. The current macroeconomic credit-risk 
model works well, but the household and non-financial enterprise credit portfolios 
are likely to be determined by different factors.
26 The enterprise credit portfolio 
could be segmented further according to the industry classification, which could 
improve the predictive power of the credit-risk model. 
3. Inclusion of modeling of the loan growth (along major sectors and industries), 
which is often identified as the leading indicator of a financial crisis. Current stress 
testing is rather static in a sense that it considers the current structure of assets and 
liabilities of the banking system. Given the rapid growth of loans 
27 (especially 
loans to households) this structure is likely to change with potential to heighten 
the credit-risk sensitivity of banking balance sheets. 
4. Improvement of modeling of the creation of profit and its distribution. In the cur-
rent version of stress testing, the profits form the first buffer of the banks in 
the case of a negative shock. For the stress-testing horizon, the “baseline” profits 
are considered to be equal to the average profit of the bank over last five years.  
5. Extension of stress-testing practices to non-bank financial institutions, such as in-
surance companies and pension funds. Although the financial system is dominated 
by banking institutions (banks comprise about 75 % of total financial-sector assets), 
financial innovations, emergence of new instruments and financial disintermedi-
ation lead to an increase of the significance of this sector. The increased signifi-
cance of complex financial groups also raises questions about possible contagion 
from these non-banking financial institutions to banks. 
26 For example, the credit risk of loans to households is more likely to be dependent on unemployment,
wage growth or demographic developments. The risk of the loans to non-financial enterprises should be 
more dependant on its relation to the foreign economy, e.g. on the exchange rate. 
27 On the issue of the rapid credit growth in Central and Eastern Europe in recent years, see for example
(Cotarelli, Ariccia, Vladkova-Holar, 2005) or (Kiss, Nagy, Vonnák, 2006). These papers try to determine 
whether the recent credit growth in many CEE countries is in line with their macroeconomic convergence,
or whether it is excessive. Finance a úvěr - Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 2007, 57(1-2)                                                59 
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